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1. INTRODUCTION
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a statistical
technique that has been used for data analysis and di-
mensionality reduction. It was introduced as a net-
work traffic anomaly detection technique firstly in [1].
Since then, a lot of research attention has been received,
which results in an extensive analysis and several ex-
tensions. In [2], the sensitivity of PCA to its tuning
parameters, such as the dimension of the low-rank sub-
space and the detection threshold, on traffic anomaly
detection was indicated. However, no explanation on
the underlying reasons of the problem was given in [2].
In [3], further investigation on the PCA sensitivity was
conducted and it was found that the PCA sensitivity
comes from the inability of PCA to detect temporal cor-
relations. Based on this finding, an extension of PCA
to Kalman-Loeve expansion (KLE) was proposed in [3].
While KLE shows slight improvement, it still exhibits
similar sensitivity issue since a new tuning parameter
called temporal correlation range was introduced. Re-
cently, in [4], additional effort was paid to illustrate the
PCA-poisoning problem. To underline this problem, an
evading strategy called Boiled-Frog was proposed which
adds a high fraction of outliers to the traffic. To de-
fend against this, the authors employed a more robust
version of PCA called PCA-GRID. While PCA-GRID
shows performance improvement regarding the robust-
ness to the outliers, it experiences a high sensitivity to
the threshold estimate and the k-dimensional subspace
that maximizes the dispersion of the data. The purpose
of this work is to consider another technique to address
the PCA poisoning problems to provide robust traffic
anomaly detection: The Principal Component Pursuit.
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2. THEPRINCIPALCOMPONENTPURSUIT
Reason behind PCA Poisoning: A foundation of
PCA is that it seeks the best rank-k estimate E of a
data matrix X by solving:
min ‖X − E‖2, subject to rank(E) ! k,
where ‖ ‖i , (i = 0, 1, 2) denotes the !i-norm.
It is worth highlighting that here, the rank k has to be
known a priori. However, this requirement can hardly
be met in real network environments. In addition, the
problem is a least square problem. It is well-known
that, while the least square gives optimal results in the
presence of Gaussian noise (e.g., low and medium inten-
sity attacks), it has been proven that it’s very sensitive
to the outliers (known as high intensity attacks). This
is mainly due to the fact that it is an !2-norm fitting
problem [7], leading to the low-rank subspace poisoning
phenomenon. This phenomenon depicts the deviation
of the principal components from the true distribution
of the data toward even a low fraction of outliers. As a
consequence, shifted principal components conduct to
a perturbation in the low-rank subspace, resulting in
inaccurate detection and high false positive rates.
Principal Component Pursuit (PCP): In order
to make the detection robust to the poisoning phe-
nomenon and without a priori requirement for the cali-
bration setting, we advocate employing Sparse and Low-
Rank Matrix Decomposition approach.
It is well-known that real traffic data, X, includes an
unknown fraction of normal traffic, N, while the remain-
ing fraction is corrupted by different types of anomalies,
A. Since normal traffic is known to be low rank [1] and
anomalies to be temporally localized or sparse in time,
an accurate anomaly detector aims to decompose the
observed traffic data into these two components and es-
sentially to solve:
min
N,A
‖A‖0, subject to X = N +A, rank (N) ≤ k (1)
This optimization problem is NP-hard [5]. However,
based on the recent advances in convex optimization
theory, it has been proven that the nuclear norm, i.e,
the sum of singular values, exactly recovers the low rank
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(a) PCA, KLE & PCP residuals on Link 4
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(b) PCA, KLE & PCP residuals on Link 9
Figure 1: PCA, KLE and PCP residuals for traffic per link data
component [5] while the !1 norm, i.e, the sum of abso-
lute values, exactly recovers the sparse component with
a remarkable robustness to the outliers in comparison to
the !2 norm [7]. Accordingly, Equation 1 can be solved
using the Principal Component Pursuit [5] defined as:
min
N,A
‖N‖∗ + λ‖A‖1, subject to X = N +A, (2)
where X denotes the traffic data X ∈ Rn1×n2 , ‖ ‖∗ de-
notes the nuclear norm of the normal data traffic matrix
N and λ is a weighting parameter. In the rest, we call
the term ‖A‖1 the PCP residual.
To solve such a convex problem, different solvers have
been proposed. We opt for the one proved to converge
Q-linearly to the optimal solution using the inexact
version of the Augmented Lagrange Multiplier(ALM)
solver [6]. Interestingly, one might expect that the scalar
λ has to be properly chosen to balance the two terms
‖N‖∗ and ‖A‖1. However, our experiment results show
that the value of λ = 2√
max(n1,n2)
, suggested in [5], pro-
vides appealing performance, making the detection free
of tuning parameters.
3. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
Our experiment used Netflow data captured in the
second week of April 2010 at the Norwegian Academic
and research Network (Uninett). To evaluate the per-
formance of PCA, KLE and PCP, we analyzed the amount
of traffic per link data matrix. Common traffic fea-
ture such as the flows amount were studied for the
biggest router in the Norwegian backbone that has 9
links. All studied metrics are obtained by aggregating
traffic at 5 minutes time bin. The studied traffic data
involve a variety of real and injected anomalies, identi-
fied by using visual inspection and several existing de-
tection techniques. Fig. 1 compares the performance
of PCA and KLE versus PCP-based anomaly detec-
tion. It is observed that the PCP residual is sparse in
time, which makes unnecessary to estimate a detection
threshold. Only the non-zero elements in the residual
vector are considered to be anomalous events. Addi-
tionally, PCA and KLE show performance degradation:
Link 9 experiences false non-zero elements for the same
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Figure 2: ROC curves: PCA, KLE and PCP
time bins where high intensive attacks (outliers) are
encountered on Link 4. This illustrates the poisoning
phenomenon propagating false positives in the observed
data. However, unlike PCA and KLE approaches, PCP
shows robustness against poisoning and has better out-
liers detection and less false positive rate. To look more
closely at the robustness behavior, the Receiver Operat-
ing Characteristic (ROC) curves of the three different
approaches are presented in Fig. 2. It is clear from
the figure that PCP shows a stable better performance.
Particularly PCP experiences a stable performance of
100 % detection rate at a false alarm rate of 21%, com-
pared to 61% detection rate for PCA and 55% for KLE
at the same false positive rate. We hence believe that
PCP is a more robust traffic anomaly detector.
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